Abstract: With the rapid development of wireless sensor technologies, mobile healthcare social network (MHSN) built upon wireless body sensor network (WBSN), has evolved into an innovative next-generation healthcare system in our aging society. Nevertheless, it is vital to focus on the security issues and the tradeoff between privacy preserving and traceability. A novel security mechanism named as the traceable threshold attribute-based signcryption (TTABSC) can permits patients to be friends and make a proper tradeoff between privacy and traceability. The proposed scheme leverages a four-party model to prevent the leak of a patient's sensitive information, including symptom information, identity and patient's health information (PHI). Combining the digital signatures and encryption, we provide a series of performance analysis, including correctness, unforgeability, traceability and privacy. Compared with previous works, our most efficient scheme generates a constant signcryption size.
Introduction
Wireless body sensor network (WBSN) has been envisioned as a burgeoning model of network since recent years due to both the considerable development of body sensors as well as the ubiquitous availability of personal digital assistants (PDAs) (Hu et al., 2013; Movassaghi et al., 2014; Al et al., 2014) . Based on the traditional centralised system WBSN, mobile healthcare social network (MHSN) is extended as a new decentralised and self-sponsored system (Zhou et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2015; Xiao et al., 2011) . As an MHSN stores and processes patients' sensitive personal information, it adds a lot of privacy and safety issues. In this paper, we will pay special attention to the security concerns during the process of the communication in MHSN.
In the system of MHSN, it is possible for two patients who have the same attributes to constitute a social group. Within this group, they could share their PHI, health status and experiences with each other. This way of socialising could provide spiritual support and encouragement to remove loneliness. For some time past, people paid their main attention to opportunistic computing (Lu et al., 2013) or handshake schemes with symptoms-matching (Lu et al., 2011) . However, the privacy information including symptom information, identity and PHI in the process of the communication have not be taken into account. What stop our steps are these four types of attacks:
• Unauthorised access. It means patients' health information (PHI) stored in both trust authority (TA) and patients themselves are accessed by an adversary without legitimate users' permission. This attack led to significant privacy issues such as a patient may not wish an insurance company unauthorised access his/her PHI when he/she does not allow. (Jeong et al., 2014) .
• Symptom reveal. It means an adversary attacks the patients to obtain their symptoms information or a stranger who does not have the same symptoms with a patient knows what symptoms this patient has. This attack led to significant matching concerns such as a patient may not wish others who are not related knowing what symptoms he has (Xing et al., 2013) .
• Message tampering. It means the message contents generated in a patient are modified or manipulated by an adversary before they are transmitted or being transmitted between patients. This attack led to significant safety concerns such as a patient may not wish to be misled by false information which are not sent from his friend.
• Non-technical fraud. It means a patient is a legal user, but he intends to send false information to others (Han and Xiao, 2014) .
For purposes of protecting from the four threats mentioned above effectively, a new mechanism must be proposed. It's supposed to realise tracing, access control, symptomsmatching, data encryption and message authentication. On one hand, such a mechanism must provide traceability when it is necessary. For example, when a patient who was bribed to send false information (e.g., advertising of illegal medical institutions, misleading treatments) to others, it is permitted to trace a malicious signature's identity Han and Xiao, 2016; Hu et al., 2015) . On the other hand, the mechanism must maintain a good balance between privacy and traceability. Moreover, offering customised must be better. This means patients may select friends based on the same attributes such as city, job, interest, etc. to share their messages, rather than according to the only factor of same symptoms in the existing works. To achieve the above goals and further enhance the usability of an MHSN, the new mechanism we developed is named as the traceable threshold attribute-based signcryption (TTABSC). In this scheme, a malicious user would be traced by the trusted authority (TA) and the private key generator (PKG) together. Because TA knows patients' identities rather than their corresponding private keys, while PKG knows patients' private keys rather than their matching identities (Ding et al., 2014) . Obviously, this satisfies the balance between privacy and traceability discussed above. This scheme also allows patients to specify a set of attributes which they are interested in. Only when patients meet the conditions each other and have the same symptoms, they could be friends.
It's what we defined as (k, d) threshold attributes and could realise the customised.
At the same time, we quote attribute-based signcryption (ABSC) to reduce the cost of certificate verification. In that, it combines signature and encryption together which has been considered particularly suitable for our purpose. However, compared with traditional scheme of signature and then encryption, although ABSC could reduce the cost of certificate verification, it does not verify data integrity (Ozdemir and Xiao, 2011) and authenticity (Xiao et al., 2013) . The TTABSC proposed in this paper then has three anticipant characteristics: traceability, threshold value and signcryption (signature and encryption), which enables unforgeability, traceability and privacy. So it can provide both security and efficiency for MHSN.
The main contributions of this paper are outlined by us as follows:
• We develop a novel scheme TTABSC, which combines the functionalities of attribute-based encryption and attribute-based signature together to reduce the cost of certificate verification. And the signing supports general (k, d) threshold.
• Considering a four-party model, we proposed our scheme which could maintain a good balance between privacy and traceability. When there is a demand, the two trusted third parties can work together to break the anonymity of signcryption in this four-party model.
• We prove the correctness of the proposed scheme in theory and analyse the security from three different angles: unforgeability, traceability and privacy.
• We evaluate the efficiency of TTABSC in terms of the signcryption size and the computational complexity compared to previous works.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the network model and necessary preliminaries. Then, Section 3 presents the main idea of TTABSC, which is followed by Section 4 presenting the performance analysis. In Section 5, we overview the related work. Finally, the conclusions of this paper are shown in Section 6.
2 Network model and preliminaries
Network model
We consider a four-party MHSN, as shown in Figure 1 . It consists of four main parties: a trusted authority (TA) located at the electronic health center (eHealth center), a private key generation (PKG), and two patients U 1 and U 2 . Among them, U 1 and U 2 are the representatives of a large quantity of mobile
• Trust authority (TA): TA which lies in the eHealth center is a reliable and significant platform. The obligation of TA is issuing attributes to users and managing the entire MHSN system. Meanwhile, it will initialise the MHSN system and save an attribute signature table corresponding the identities of patients. For example, patients will give their identities to the TA and then get their attributes.
• Private key generation (PKG): PKG is a third-party entity to provide services. The responsibility of PKG is generating private keys for users. And it will save a private key table corresponding the signature of patients' attributes. For example, patients will give their attributes to the PKG and then get private keys for every attribute.
• Patient U 1 : U 1 is a sender. First of all, he gets his attributes from the TA. Then, PKG will send him a valid private key related to his attributes. Finally, U 1 can create signatures using the private key.
• Patient U 2 : U 2 is a receiver. He verifies signatures generated by U 1 using his private key. In our system, each registered user (U i ∈ U ) is provided with wireless body sensors (implanted sensors and wearable sensors) and a wireless personal digital assistant (PDA) device. For providing better healthcare services, these PDA devices can collect and send PHI (blood pressure, heart rate, etc.) to the TA periodically. As we all know, PHI and the patient's symptoms have closely relationship. Patients U = {U 1 , U 2 , · · · } in our model will constitute a users group for the MHSN, because of their mobility and sociality. This is different from the traditional in-bed patients at home or hospital.
As for mobility, each patient in this network can move and go out for a walk. Expediently, they can report their PHI to the TA only if there is an Access Point (AP) available nearby. But the in-bed patients must at hospital or home to realise healthcare monitoring. Because patients in the MHSN are equipped with wireless body sensors and a wireless PDA which could connect to an AP.
Besides, different patients with various attributes have different sociality in MHSN. Active patients may be friends with other patients who have the same attributes, so as to exchange PHI, health status and experiences to provide spiritual support and encouragement to each other. In that case, we claim that those patients are social. On the contrary, some patients without sociality are hard to build a certain social relationship, even though they often meet with each other.
Preliminaries
We now introduce some preliminaries for our TTABSC scheme.
• Bilinear maps Let G and G T be a cyclic additive group and a cyclic multiplicative group, respectively. Their order is both a large prime q, and P is a generator of G. Our proposed TTABSC uses an admissible bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T , which is a map with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For ∀P , Q ∈ G and any a, b ∈ Z * q , there is e (aP, bQ) = e (P, Q) ab ;
• Non-degeneracy: e (P, Q) ̸ = 1 GT ;
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e (P, Q) for all P , Q ∈ G.
• With the bilinear maps, the proposed scheme has the following different versions of the quantitative concept of the complexity problem, namely the computational inverse Diffie-Hellman (IDH) and the λ Diffie-Hellman exponentiation (λ − DHE) problems.
Inverse Diffie-Hellman (IDH): Given a group G 1 generated by g, and a group G 2 who has the same prime order p as G 1 . Let e :
, there is no polynomial-time adversary could calculate g a b using more than a superiority that can not be ignored.
, where h ∈ G 2 and a ∈ Z p are chosen at random, the objective of
.
• Matching metric function calculated (MMFC)
As for matching users' symptoms, we let
< n, the symptoms of patient U i and U j are matched. The correctness of MMFC is proved in Appendix A.
Security measures
Our scheme should satisfy correctness, unforgeability, traceability and privacy. We now outline the security measures for TTABSC as follows. • Setup: S selects the system parameters P P and runs the Setup algorithm. Here the S's parameters selection just means that Adv is not allowed to access the challenge plaintext.
• Query: Adv makes the following polynomial bounded number of queries, which would be answered by S:
• 
The advantage of Adv is defined as his probability of winning the game.
Definition 3 (Traceability): When there is a demand, the two trusted third parties can work together to find out the identity of the user. Then we say the TTABSC scheme has traceability.
Definition 4 (Privacy): We define the universe of attributes U, predicate Γ, message m, two signers with ID 1 , ID 2 , whose attributes ω 1 , ω 2 and a valid ciphertext generated by one of them CT . If the set of attribute ω ⊂ U, then Γ (ω) = 1. So, Γ (ω 1 ) = 1 and Γ (ω 2 ) = 1. Given m, ID 1 , ID 2 , ω 1 , ω 2 and CT , any polynomial-time adversary cannot find out which set of attributes ω 1 or ω 2 generates the ciphertext, if he does not break the TA and the PKG at the same time. Then, our TTABSC scheme satisfies privacy.
3 Traceable threshold attribute-based signcryption
Scheme structure
As shown in Figure 2 , four entities in our scheme achieve the TTABSC, which will be elaborated in the following subsection. Here, we first provide the framework of the scheme.
In the attributes distribution phase, TA runs the ASetup algorithm and Issue algorithm. The ASetup algorithm first defines the universe of attributes U, and then generates the system parameter and TA's secret key with the given security parameter λ. Followed by the second step, the Issue algorithm takes a patient's identity and the verification materials ω as input, and then outputs a signature of the attributes using the TA's secret key after verifying ω.
In the private keys generation phase, PKG runs the Setup algorithm and the Extract algorithm. Given λ and U of this system, the Setup algorithm then outputs the public parameters pp and a master secret key mk. In order to realise the flexible (k, d) threshold, we not only use U, but also choose some default attribute set Ω. This method have been presented by Sahai and Waters (2005) . Followed by the fourth step, the Extract algorithm takes the user's attributes set W s and its signature Sig (W s ) as input, and then outputs the private key. Here, the private keys of sender and receiver are different. When PKG computes private keys for users, it only knows W s , rather than the identity of the users.
The sender along with attributes W s runs the Signcrypt algorithm. In this algorithm, a message m and a signing predicate Γ are regarded as input parameters. When Γ (W s ) = 1, the Signcrypt algorithm will compute and output a valid signature σ.
The receiver along with attributes W r runs the Unsigncrypt algorithm. In this algorithm, a signature σ of message m under predicate Γ and the receiver's private key
are regarded as input parameters. If W r satisfies some equations, the algorithm will output the plaintext m; otherwise, the algorithm will output the symbol ⊥. For consistency, we require that
. Finally, if there is a need, the TA and the PKG will connect with each other to run the Trace algorithm. Given the signature σ, the algorithm will output the signer's identity.
The proposed TTABSC
In this subsection, we present a TTABSC with the symptomsmatching scheme. The detailed is described as follows.
ASetup:
The algorithm first defines the universe of attributes U, and then generates the system parameter λ as input, and then generates the system parameters and TA's secret key with the given security parameter λ.
Issue: The algorithm takes a patient's identity and the verification materials ω as input. Then, it outputs a signature Figure 2 The access control structure (see online version for colours) of the attributes Sig (W s ) using the TA's secret key after verifying ω. At the same time, the TA also saves an attribute signature Setup: (1) Given λ and U, it first chooses two bilinear group G and G T of prime order p, and two generators g 1 and g 2 of G. Let e: G×G → G T be a bilinear map. Select two hash functions
Here, n 1 is the message's bit length. Then, the PKG computes g 1 = g α and Z = e (g 1 , g 2 ) α .
(2) Next, we suppose b = |U| be the length of U and let U = {1, 2, . . . , b} for simplicity. To achieve a flexible d threshold, we choose a d − 1 default attributes set shown as Ω = {b
Here, n 2 is the length of the attributes of sender. And we define functions
and
(3) Finally, the public parameters are given by
Extract: The algorithm takes mk, W s and Sig (W s ) as input. After verifying Sig (W s ), the PKG extracts the private key for each patient in the following steps:
(1) Chooses a polynomial q (x) of d − 1 degree at random such that q (0) = α. (1)
For each i ∈ W s ∪ Ω, the PKG selects random r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r i ∈ Z ⋆ p and computes
For each i ∈ W r ∪ W d , the PKG selects random r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r i ∈ Z ⋆ p and computes 
Signcrypt: Given the set of encryption attributes W e and the signing predicate Γ k,W⋆ (·). 
(2) Select a random x ∈ Z ⋆ p and compute
(4) Finally, the signcryption for m is published as:
Unsigncrypt:
′ , X, C, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 ), the receiver P j performs the unsigncryption in the following steps:
If the aforementioned equations do not exist at the same time, output ⊥.
and then retrieve the message as m = C ⊕ H 2 (Y ).
• The receiver P j verifies the following equation:
Trace: Given the message m, its signature σ and the predicate Γ k,W * (·), the Trace algorithm then computes:
Finally, the PKG obtains the signature of the signer's attributes Sig (W s ) from his saving private key table and send Sig (W s ) to the TA. Then the TA will output the signer's ID after looking through his saving attribute signature table.
Performance analysis
In this section, we analyse the scheme's correctness, and prove its security in terms of unforgeability, traceability and privacy.
In the end, we also present its efficiency from the aspects of the signcryption size and the computation complexity.
Correctness
In this subsection, we verify that our proposed scheme TTABSC indeed has feasibility and correctness.
Theorem 1: The TTABSC scheme presented in Section 3 has correctness.
Proof: We get the secret key
n1 , then the decryption procedure can be established as follows:
This completes the proof.
Theorem 2: After retrieving the message, equation (6) can prove whether the adversary has forged or falsified the received message.
Proof: If the adversary does not forge or falsify the retrieved message, equation (6) should be shown as follows: 
Unforgeability
Then, the unforgeability of TTABSC will be presented in the following analysis.
Theorem 3: The unforgeability of the proposed scheme TTABSC is based on the hardness of the λ − DHE problem in the random oracle model.
More specifically, suppose that the adversary Adv makes less than q k Key-Extraction queries and q s Signcyption queries to break our TTABSC scheme with advantage ε. Then we can build an algorithm F to solve the λ − DHE problem with a non-negligible advantage ε ′ . Accordingly, we have:
Here, n 1 and n 2 are the bit number of a message and patient's ID, respectively. So, we intended to get the relationship between ε and ε ′ by algorithm F. The inequation means: if there exists an adversary Adv to attack our scheme with the advantage ε, then it is possible for the algorithm F to solve the λ − DHE problem with the advantage ε ′ , but this assumption is not established, since the λ − DHE problem is hard, so the TTABSC scheme satisfies the security of unforgeability. How do an algorithm F structure a scheme to solve the λ − DHE problem is described in the following proof.
Proof: Select ε to represent the advantage of adversary Adv breaking TTABSC. Let F be an algorithm to break the λ − DHE problem. The existence of this algorithm means, given
According to the security definition, the algorithm F interacts with the adversary Adv as follows.
• Initial: The adversary Adv gives F partial user's signcryption attributes set W * S and a challenge predicate
• Setup: First, the algorithm F lets g 1 = g, g 2 = g a . After that F produces the master secret key α = a λ clandestinely. So we have
. In addition, F sets l µ = 2 (q k + q s ), l m = 2q s and chooses two integers k µ and k m at random (note that 0 ≤ k µ ≤ l µ and 0 ≤ k m ≤ l m ). With the given values q k , q s , n 1 and n 2 , we assume that l µ (n 2 + 1) < p and l m (n 1 + 1) < p. F chooses a random integer a 0 ∈ Z lµ and a vector ⃗ A = (a i ) of length n 2 , where a i is a random integer from Z lµ for all i. Similarly, F randomly selects another integer b 0 ∈ Z lm and a n 1 -length vector ⃗ B = (b i ), where b i is a random integer from Z lm for all i. Furthermore, F selects two random integers w 0 , v 0 ∈ Z p . And for all i and j, F chooses two random vectors ⃗ W = (w i ) and ⃗ V = (v j ) of length n 2 and n 1 respectively, in which w i ∈ Z p and v j ∈ Z p . To keep it simple, we state two pairs of functions for an identity u and a message m respectively, which are shown as follows:
Then, F constructs some public parameters as follows:
From this evaluation, we can get the following equations for any identity u and message m:
Finally, F provides Adv the system parameters
• Query: Adversary Adv makes a polynomial bounded number of queries to F, the specific query process is equivalent to the definition of unforgeability in Subsection 2.3, it includes Key-Extraction queries and Signcryption queries.
• Forgery: Eventually, for the given identity
, otherwise F could solve the aforementioned λ − DHE problem in the following steps. According to the Unsigncryption phase, we have:
Therefore, the forged signcryption result CT * is valid. This means that the equation mentioned above can be rewritten as follows:
) .
Note that
That is, F can obtain:
ri which is the solution to the given λ − DHE problem.
In order to complete the simulation without aborting, we need to implement the following conditions:
• We require that the outputting forged message m * have K (m * ) = 0modp, and we define this event as A.
• We also define the event B as F (u * ) = 0modp. F complete the simulation mentioned above without aborting, and we define this event as win. Then:
It can be easily seen that the events A, B and win are independent. In essence, this is because these events are defined by the functions F and K. And we select F and K independently and hide them from the adversary's view of the simulation as well. Then, like the analysis in Paterson and Schuldt (2006) , we have:
Then we get that:
Consequently, we could conclude with
This means that if the simulation completes without aborting, Adv would create a valid forgery with probability at least ε, then F could figure g a λ+1 from the forgery as shown above.
Traceability
As for traceability, the two trusted third parties will connect with each other to run the Trace algorithm. Only if given a valid signature, the algorithm will output the signer's identity.
Theorem 4:
The Trace algorithm equation (7) in the TTABSC scheme in Section 3 satisfies traceability.
Proof: Just in a similar way as in the proof of correctness.
Privacy
Theorem 5: The TTABSC scheme in Section 3 fully demonstrates the privacy.
Proof: First, we need to demonstrate that everybody cannot distinguish which attributes have been used to signcrypt by the singer if only given a ciphertext. S selects the system parameters P P and generates the master key mk = α, Adv picks a default attribute set Ω, two sets of attributes ω 1 and ω 2 , and then let 
So, according to the Lagrange interpolation theorem, this ciphertext could be produced by sk i1 or sk i2 , and Adv cannot distinguish which kind of set ω 1 or ω 2 is used to generate the ciphertext.
Next, only when the TA and the PKG work together, we can get the signer's ID using the given signature. Note that the mapping relationship from e (g 1 , g s 1 ) to the ID of a singer is saved in two different tables which are kept by the TA and the PKG respectively. So, although anyone can compute e (g 1 , g s 1 ) from the Trace algorithm equation (7), they cannot get the singer's ID.
Efficiency
In this section, the efficiency is compared in the view of the signcryption size (SS), the computation complexity (CC) and traceability. Our TTABSC scheme is designed to solve the long-winded ciphertext problem presented in Gagn et al. (2010) , so we put it as a comparison. At the same time, we also compare TTABSC with a scheme which could realise the function of ABE and ABS simultaneously (Herranz and Morillo, 2011) + (Sahai and Waters, 2005) . The result is shown in Table 1 . Here, N 1 and N 2 are the size of encryption attributes and signature attributes respectively, d denotes the value of the system threshold (know that d < N 1 and d < N 2 ). Besides, |G 1 | and |G 2 | represent the bit length of group G 1 and G 2 appeared in the comparison respectively. And for simplicity, P is set as once pairing operation.
From this table, we can get that, Gagn et al. (2010) neither realise traceability nor achieve the function of ABE and ABS in one process of logic, but the SS and the CC are proportional to N 1 and N 2 . However, in our scheme, the SS and the CC are constant. And so, our scheme and Gagn et al. (2010) are almost equal in terms of the average of the SS and the CC. Besides, compared with the scheme of Herranz and Morillo (2011) + Sahai and Waters (2005) , our scheme is more efficient.
Therefore, we can conclude that our scheme is more efficient than others.
Related work
As far as we all know, the majority of works on a MHSN system have not consider the communication security issues between patients. So in the following summary, the most germane existing research are shown in three cases:
• securing a WBSN
• securing an MHSN
• identity-based cryptography.
Research on the WBSN has grown tremendously recently. Movassaghi et al. (2014) security between a PDA and a BSN controller, which may be a user's mobile phone. Other studies also discussed how to prevent the ATM and the online adversaries from stealing the patient's password by Xiao et al. (2014) . At the same time, there are many people paid attention to analyse the transmissions security between a BSN and its external users, who may be doctors or nurses in Hu et al. (2013) . But different from the WBSN, an MHSN has two characteristics: mobility and sociality. And it mainly studied the security issues between patients. So the research of ordinary WBSN cannot be directly applied to a MHSN. Nevertheless, most of the existing researches of MHSN are aimed at how to protect patients' privacy in the process of symptoms-matching, but pay less attention to the security issues of communications between patients. For example, Lu et al. (2011) introduce a same-symptom-based handshake (SSH) scheme, in which each patient is assigned to a false identity for protecting PHI. Subsequently, Lu et al. (2013) put forward an efficient user-centric privacy access control in opportunistic computing frame, which allows a patient to decide who could take part in the opportunistic computing to assist in disposing his inundatory PHI data. And an attributebased patient access control protocol has been proposed to minimise violation of a patient's privacy in the environment of an emergency situation in Jeong et al. (2014) . Then Jiang et al. (2015) proposed a scheme which could accomplish finegrained access strategies for the sharing of PHI in MHSNs. In addition, all these schemes are more inclined to use ABE encryption in the process of communications between patients.
investigated the transmissions
Although, secure and efficient identity-based cryptography has been profoundly studied such as attribute-based signatures (Maji et al., 2010; Herranz and Morillo, 2011) ), attributebased ring signatures (Wang and Chen, 2010) ). In practical scenarios, these schemes require a quantity of overhead on both encryption and signature. Therefore, Gagn et al. (2010) and Zheng et al. (2015) proposed threshold attribute-based signcryption which combines the functions of encryption and signature with the certificateless authentication. But they do not provide traceability-another important requirement of MHSN security. Fortunately, Kaafarani et al. (2014) 's scheme whereby a special tracing authority equipped with a secret key is capable of revealing the identity of the signer. The same year, to achieve a good balance between privacy and traceability, Ding et al. (2014) proposed a novel mechanism for traceable attribute-based signature (TABS). And Wei et al. (2014) improved the functionality and efficiency simultaneously. Although these schemes could provide traceability previously, it is unrealistic to apply them in MHSNs directly. This is because of mobile devices' limited computation/communication capacity and high requirement of low delay. On the contrary, we propose a TTABSC scheme in this paper which significantly reduces the computation and communication overhead.
Conclusion
It is of vital importance to design a secure TTABSC for the successful MHSN, yet which have been paid less attention. In this paper, we give an efficient TTABSC scheme based on the bilinear pairings. The proposed scheme also maintains a good balance between privacy and traceability. With the provable security technique, the TTABSC has been proved to be secure in the MHSN. In our scheme, patients could select their friends who have the same symptoms and attributes with them, and they could not be worried about being deceived. Detailed performance analysis also confirmed the high efficiency of our scheme over prior work. So, all this make MHSN could be widely accepted by patients. In our future work, we will use more new technologies to improve the practicability of the MHSN.
